Does the opportunity cost approach indicate the real cost of REDD+ ? Rights and realities of paying for REDD+ by Gregersen, Hans et al.
Does the Opportunity Cost 
Approach Indicate the Real Cost 
of REDD+ ?
Rights and Realities of Paying for REDD+
Hans Gregersen, Hosny El Lakany, Alain 
Karsenty and Andy White
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Hans Gregersen is Professor Emeritus, University of Minnesota, Departments of Forest Resources and Applied Econom-
ics. He consults widely with the major international organizations dealing with forest policy and development and 
served for a number of years as the chair of the CGIAR’s Impact Assessment Group, housed in FAO, Rome.
Hosny El Lakany is Adjunct Professor and Director of International Programs, Faculty of Forestry, University of British 
Columbia, Canada. Formerly, Assistant Director-General/ Head of Forestry Department, FAO. He teaches and consults in 
International Forest Policies. 
Dr. Alain Karsenty is an economist with CIRAD (Montpellier, France). He is a researcher with exstensive experience in 
public policies and economics in tropical forests, especially in Central Africa.  He has an extensive knowledge of timber 
markets, forestry legislations and reform processes in Central African countries, and is a consultant for international 
organisations, such as the World Bank, the EU, and the ITTO.
Andy White is the Coordinator of the Rights and Resources Initiative, Washington, DC, USA.
THE RIGHTS AND RESOURCES INITIATIVE
The Rights and Resources Initiative is a global coalition to advance forest tenure, policy, and market reforms.  
RRI is composed of international, regional, and community organizations engaged in conservation, research,  
and development.
The mission of the Rights and Resources Initiative is to promote greater global action on pro-poor forest policy  
and market reforms to increase household and community ownership, control, and benefits from forests  
and trees. RRI is coordinated by the Rights and Resources Group, a non-profit organization based  
in Washington D.C. For more information,  visit www.rightsandresources.org.
The views presented here are those of the authors and are not necessarily shared by coalition Partners nor by DFID,  
Ford Foundation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Norad, SDC and Sida, who have generously supported this 
work.
Cover Photography Credit: Jan McAlpine, Director, UNFF Secretariat. New York, NY, USA. 
PARTNERS
SUPPORTERS
 
Does the Opportunity Cost Approach 
Indicate the Real Cost of REDD+?
Rights and Realities of Paying for REDD+
H. GREGERSEN, H. EL LAKANY, A. KARSENTY, AND A. WHITE
Rights and Resources Initiative
Washington DC
 
Does the Opportunity Cost Approach Indicate the Real Cost of REDD+? 
© 2010 Rights and Resources Initiative.
Reproduction permitted with attribution
iii
1. introduction 1
2. Drivers of deforestation, property rights and opportunity cost 4
2.1      When deforestation is forbidden by statutory law or zoning regulations 5
2.2      When removal of forest cover is permitted by law  6
2.3      When legal property and use rights have not been defined clearly  
and assigned definitively to groups or individuals occupying land 11
3. The way ahead: Helping governments get the REDD+ response  framework right. 15
References 19
Endnotes 22
CONTENTS
1There is international agreement to include 
REDD+1 among the global climate mitigation 
strategies.  REDD+ is widely supported for two main 
reasons: first because deforestation accounts for 
somewhere between 12 to 18 % of global GHG emis-
sions, and second because addressing this problem 
is widely thought to be the low-cost option to 
curtail CO2 emissions.  In this paper we question 
whether the opportunity cost approach  used in 
most of the major global climate change studies 
covering REDD opportunities2 provides realistic es-
timates of payments actually needed to implement 
equitable and effective REDD+ programs.3 
There is no question that in a well-functioning 
market economy opportunity cost provides a 
conceptually satisfactory indicator of the minimum 
amount that would need to be paid to forest own-
ers or users not to deforest, under the assumption 
that a rational economic entity would want to be 
paid at least as much as the entity gives up by not 
deforesting.4  As a side point, in the particular case 
of REDD+, the additionality and non leakage criteria 
have to be met in order for opportunity cost or any 
other indicator of cost to be a meaningful indica-
tor in determining justifiable payments for REDD.5  
Since these criteria apply regardless of what mea-
sure of cost or needed payment is used, we do not 
delve further into them in this paper.6  
While in theory and under certain real-world 
conditions opportunity cost provides a useful 
indicator of payments needed, we see a number of 
problems in using it in the main political, social and 
economic contexts faced in the tropical countries 
that will be implementing REDD+.7  Relying on these 
estimates could lead us in the wrong direction 
and could discourage many potential supporters, 
once the real required payments and costs are 
recognized.8  Below we summarize some of the 
main contextual issues that need to be addressed 
in using opportunity cost indicators.  The follow-
ing paragraphs discuss the issues in detail.  The 
final part of the paper refocuses the discussion on 
some of the other cost and institutional investment 
related issues that we need to focus on and address 
as the international community moves forward 
with REDD+.
First, opportunity cost may be inappropriate, 
e.g., in the case of illegal logging and other illegal 
activities that result in deforestation.9  Second, it 
may be inadequate in terms of understanding what 
payments are needed to halt deforestation, e.g., in 
cases where there are side payments being made 
or where decisions that lead to deforestation have 
been made for strong political reasons, or where 
the groups involved don’t really understand what 
they would be promising and what their alterna-
tives are, or where property and/or land use rights 
are not adequately defined.  
Third, if one is not dealing with a well-function-
ing market system, it may be difficult to estimate 
opportunity cost correctly, e.g., in the case of slash 
and burn farmers or shifting cultivators that oper-
ate mostly outside established market systems.  
This is because it is perceived opportunity cost 
by the recipient that matters in terms of provid-
ing incentive not to deforest; and that might be 
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extremely high if perceived survival this coming 
year depends on deforesting and growing crops 
on the cleared land. The farmers may face a great 
deal of uncertainty as to what this payment not to 
deforest means.  The nature of the aspirations of 
the poor to get themselves and particularly their 
children out of poverty, and their perceptions of 
what is needed to do so also comes into play here.  
There is a fairness issue that needs to be addressed.
Fourth,  and related to the previous point, 
if major carbon offset markets develop, then the 
price paid to forest land owners not to deforest and 
thus create the offsets would be determined by 
the market and not the various opportunity costs 
of the various forest owners or potential users of 
the forest.   In a well functioning carbon market, 
forest owners at the margin would get paid their 
perceived opportunity cost, while all others would 
be earning Ricardian rents above their various op-
portunity costs, since they would be lower than the 
market clearing price.   If the actual value of REDD+ 
payments is to be anywhere near the value derived 
by aggregating across opportunity costs of various 
forest owners/users, then one needs to make the 
unrealistic assumption that there will be some sort 
of “discriminatory price tender” where everyone 
will bid their lowest acceptable price (i.e., their op-
portunity cost) to some discriminating entity that 
then will pay them that price.10  
There are many more potential issues that 
need to be addressed in developing realistic esti-
mates payments and costs required for successful 
REDD+.  For example, if there are perverse incen-
tives that encourage deforestation, then they must 
be dealt with or built into the costs that need to be 
covered.  Some twenty years ago, Binswanger (1991) 
argued strongly that efforts to curtail deforesta-
tion in the Brazilian Amazon were hampered by “…
tax policies, special tax incentives, rules of land 
allocation and an agricultural credit system that 
all accelerate deforestation in the Amazon.” (p.1)  
While Brazil has addressed many of these distorting 
policies, some remain and need to be factored into 
calculations of what the realistic cost of reducing 
deforestation will be.  Binswanger points out that 
no matter how good the incentives are, there will 
be need for substantial investment in the strength-
ening of the enforcement of laws and regulations 
related to forest use and misuse.  This point has 
been echoed by many since then (cf. Caldas et al 
2010). The costs of policy reform need to be built 
into the bottom line estimates of what it realisti-
cally will cost to reduce deforestation.
There also is the question of how opportunity 
costs are estimated.  As pointed out by Wertz-
Kanounnikoff (2008), the two main approaches to 
estimating opportunity costs are empirical (global 
and local) models and global simulation models.  
Opportunity cost estimates vary widely, depending 
on which method is used.  Wertz-Kanounnikoff con-
cludes that:  “The ‘true’ cost estimate is most likely 
to lie somewhere in between the values provided 
by the local-empirical models on the one hand 
(lower end) and global simulation models on the 
other (higher end).” (p.5) This point also is made by 
Pirard (2008a): “numerous interpretations of the op-
portunity cost concept coexist in the literature and 
in influential reports (e.g. Stern review), with differ-
ing estimated values for similar cases.”  (p.512).
Finally, we have to remember that opportunity 
cost is not a static concept.  It changes as market 
forces change, as technology improves, and as new 
technologies emerge.  In the particular case of defor-
estation to open land for bioenergy crops,  Persson 
and Azar (2010) point out that if the price of carbon 
increases so would the price of bioenergy produced 
from bioenergy crops that are responsible for a 
significant amount of deforestation.  Land prices, in 
turn, also would go up, since the opportunity cost of 
not producing the bioenergy crop would increase.  
This relationship would continue up to the point 
where other renewable, non-land intensive energy 
alternatives would become competitive.  Most of the 
existing studies do not add a dynamic perspective 
on how opportunity costs will change as relative de-
mand and supply conditions for timber or products 
produced on cleared forest land will change (under 
the assumption of negligible leakage).
While these limitations on the use of oppor-
tunity cost for estimating payments required for 
3successful REDD+ are not new to most economists, 
they have not been discussed adequately and fo-
cused on in policy discussions on the likely real cost 
of REDD+.  The same can be said about the costs of 
resolving equity and rights issues related to slash 
and burn agriculture and dealing with disputes 
over land rights and titles.
The basic point of this paper is that the 
contextual issues influencing the adequacy and 
appropriateness of opportunity cost as a proxy for 
payments required to get successful REDD+ can be 
major ones in in most tropical developing coun-
tries; and resolving them can be expensive and time 
consuming.  More assessment and discussion of 
these issues are needed.  Without resolving them, 
the opportunity cost estimates could misguide us 
in terms of reaching the ultimate goal for REDD+.  
The contextual issues  relate to the institutional 
side of REDD+: to governance issues, to basic prop-
erty and use rights in relation to the main drivers 
of deforestation and degradation, to links between 
REDD payments and leakages and “environmental 
blackmail,” to logistical problems (transactions 
costs) in making payments to forest owners and 
users, to problems of corruption and illegal activity, 
to the nature and size of the associated transac-
tions, implementation and institutional investment 
costs required to make REDD work effectively, and 
to demand and  market issues.  They also relate very 
directly to questions of fairness and income dis-
tribution.  In the words of one of our reviewers, “…
the poor need to be compensated a lot less because 
they are, well, poor.”
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Widespread deforestation and degradation, 
particularly of tropical forests, is a well-recognized 
problem, as are the reasons why it takes place (cf. 
Geist and Lambin, 2002; Kaimowitz and Angelsen, 
1999, Contreras-Hermosilla, 2000).  In trying to 
understand the real costs required to change defor-
estation behavior, it’s important to start with the 
question of what rights the forest owner, or user 
has.  Unfortunately, this rather simple question 
is often very difficult to answer.  To begin, forest 
rights fall into two categories: customary – the 
rights and systems of rights that are determined 
by local people – and statutory – the formal, legal, 
framework of rights that is embodied in local, 
national, or international, law.  While the statutory 
framework is applied by government to all lands, 
it is often inconsistent with the customary system, 
and in many countries rights are not clear or may 
be contested.  Thus, unfortunately, in most tropical 
countries there is a big “grey” area where people 
have some customary rights but the statutory 
rights are not clear or adequately defined.  
This somewhat confused situation yields 
three different, and often overlapping, legal 
situations in which deforestation or degradation 
occurs: (1) land owners/users clearly don’t have the 
statutory right to deforest (or have a limited right 
to make changes in land use, but not to deforest); 
(2) land owners/legitimate users clearly have the 
statutory right to deforest or change use on part 
or all of their land; or 3) land owners/users are 
occupying and using lands where legal property 
rights are unclear.  In many cases, these are lands 
that have been used for many generations under 
traditional rights regimes.  
All three situations are illustrated by the cur-
rent situation in the Brazilian Amazon where about 
40 percent of the forest land is in the “grey area” 
category (Terra devoluta).11  At the same time, and 
to Brazil’s credit, some 35 percent of the land that 
was in this category has now been formally desig-
nated as indigenous territories or state and federal 
protected areas. In other forested countries such 
designated areas are scarce and the percentage of 
land in the unclear rights category is greater.  While 
in the strictest legal sense these public domain 
lands may fit in category (1) above, in reality and in 
the context of lives and livelihoods on the ground, 
there is uncertainty. Thus, we include the third cate-
gory: (3) land users under traditional rights regimes 
or in “direct action land reform” (DALR) settlements 
where clear, legal rights or titles to the land that 
they are occupying have not yet been defined or 
are unclear in legal terms, often because even the 
boundaries of such lands have not been delineated, 
particularly on the ground.12 In many major forest 
countries, these lands are a major portion of the 
forest land that is of interest in REDD negotiations.  
Fortunately, a number of countries are aggressively 
moving to clarify property rights by providing legal 
rights or property titles to communities, indigenous 
peoples or individuals, or by establishing legal 
reserves, national forests, parks and so forth. 
Below we examine the implications in each of 
the above cases in terms of using opportunity cost 
to estimate what it would cost to halt deforestation.
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forbidden by statutory law. The opportunity cost of 
deforesting and using the land for another purpose 
is not appropriate in this case, even though it could 
be calculated.  If illegal commercial logging or 
deforestation for other commercial purposes take 
place, then the cost of improving the enforcement 
of the law generally should be the relevant cost for 
the government, not the opportunity cost to the 
persons undertaking the illegal activity.  As the IWG-
IFR (2009) report states,
 …average or marginal private op-
portunity cost does not necessarily reflect 
the incentive required to the country to 
reach the emission reductions target. For 
instance, in some countries significant 
results could be achieved through im-
proved law enforcement, which could be 
achieved with relatively low investment, 
much lower than would be needed for 
REDD+ to compete with illegal activities.
(p.23)
Boerner and Wunder (2008) bring up the inter-
esting example from the Brazilian Amazon where 
a combination of improved law enforcement and 
incentive payments might be required:  “Brazilian 
forest retention standards require 50-80% of private 
property in the Amazon region to remain under 
forest. Although few farmers de facto comply with 
this requirement, REDD in these areas would legally 
not be additional. Conversely, restricting payments 
exclusively to legally convertible forests on private 
properties would dramatically reduce the scope for 
REDD. Some combination of improved command-
and-control tools and incentives is probably neces-
sary. (p.508).”
If one wanted to look at enforcing land use 
laws in a benefit-cost context, then, applying a 
simple “with and without” calculation, the net ben-
efit to the nation when it effectively enforces the 
laws, would in rough terms be equal to the losses 
avoided (i.e., the revenues and non market values 
of the forest that the nation otherwise would have 
lost due to the illegal activity) minus the additional 
costs of making enforcement effective.  This might 
very well turn out to be a large positive number.  
Or it might be low or even negative, depending on 
whose viewpoint is taken. 
In some cases, the political cost of contain-
ing vested interests and corruption that enables 
illegal logging could be perceived as extremely 
high for the government decision makers involved, 
even though it could yield collective net gains 
for nation as a whole. This is characteristic of the 
so-called “governments with private agendas” (Laf-
font, 2000) where prominent positions (including 
chances of being reelected) and personal enrich-
ment of those in charge of the administration, de-
pend on their capacity to redistribute riches into 
their networks and to give powerful economic in-
terests access to natural resources. This phenom-
enon is well-known in development studies13.  It 
sometimes is related to the apparent insufficient 
absorptive capacity of recipient governments to 
effectively use ODA. The basic point is that numer-
ous  civil servants have no personal interest in 
meeting the conditions required for effective for-
eign aid disbursement (and doing needed reforms), 
but, conversely, they could be very active and 
innovative in designing ways for diverting public 
assets for their own sake. In such contexts, there 
are private opportunity costs – but not easy to 
calculate as they are hidden and illegitimate – and 
there are potential net collective gains (of tackling 
illegal activity). Many economists tend to ignore in 
their calculations such trade-offs between private 
opportunity costs (that are generally political 
costs) and potential public benefits.
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In cases where removal of forest cover, partial 
or total is permitted or required by law14, op-
portunity cost is a good measure of what it costs 
society to reduce deforestation and the associated 
emissions of greenhouse gases.  However, that 
does not mean that it effectively can be used as 
an indicator of the amount that governments will 
have to pay to entities to get effective, efficient 
and equiatable REDD+ at a meaningful scale?  The 
answer to this question depends on what kind of 
forest owner/agent and what socio-political and 
economic contexts we are dealing with.  Are we 
dealing with (1) a government entity? (2) individual 
or collective groups of Indigenous Peoples, forest 
communities, and other entities that have clear 
legal rights to the forest lands they live on and 
they generally are outside or on the fringe of the 
formal market economy?  (3) individuals or private 
partnerships that have clear title to their forest 
land and participate in the market economy? Or 
(4) a corporate entity with a fiduciary obligation to 
their stockholders to do what is best for their busi-
ness, e.g., logging, commercial livestock, soy bean, 
biofuel, etc. corporations?  In what follows, we look 
at each of these entities.
GOVERNMENTS
If we are dealing with a government agency 
that either directly or indirectly causes deforesta-
tion of lands in the public domain, it generally does 
so for a purpose.  Thus, government may:  
 be involved in resettlement or land reform and 
it gives forest land to landless poor people (and 
some not so poor).  In order to take title to the land, 
the agency involved requires the settler to put a 
certain portion of the land into agriculture, which 
requires clearing the land.  
 want forests cleared in some border areas and 
land settled for national security reasons; 
 be giving out large concessions or land leases 
to domestic or international timber, oil or minerals 
companies to raise revenues for the country.  
 indirectly cause deforestation by not having ad-
equate manpower and technology to enforce bans 
on illegal logging or other illegal forest clearing.  
 have officials that do not enforce laws against 
deforestation or forest degradation because there 
may be corruption and side payments involved.  
In most of these cases, the relevant cost 
of incentives to change behavior and halt  the 
deforestation depends on a host of factors other 
than the theoretically best alternative use for the 
forest land (i.e., the opportunity cost).  For example, 
the basic opportunity cost for the government to 
reduce logging concessions would be equal to the 
various revenue streams that would be foregone 
from not giving out logging concessions or leases 
to companies.  This may or may not be anywhere 
near the actual opportunity cost to the companies 
associated with the logging operations, particularly 
if the country is in a weak bargaining position (e.g., 
only one bidder).  The contract price may be far 
below the theoretical opportunity cost, or a fair 
market value for the concession under conditions 
of competition.  
As Karsenty (2007) points out with an example 
from Cameroon, the concession fees forgone would 
be just a part of the overall opportunity cost to the 
government.  If the logs are processed in country by 
a foreign entity, then there are the loss of log taxes, 
mill employment and taxes, export taxes and fees, 
etc.  These revenue and employment losses to the 
country can vastly overshadow the lost concession 
fees.  The whole dynamics of converting natural 
resources into other forms of capital to be used in 
development enter the picture.
Grainger (1997) makes the point that many of 
the rich developed countries fueled their develop-
ment by decimating their forests and converting 
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are being built back up through afforestation, 
reforestation and management. (Sweden and the 
United States are prime examples).  Why should a 
nation that still has rich forest resources ignore 
this history and the social opportunity cost of not 
converting its forests into other forms of capital to 
fuel development? If corruption is not involved, and 
if the country is looking at its future in a develop-
ment mode, it surely might come up with a differ-
ent, much higher cost of opportunities foregone 
than the simple opportunity cost perceived by an 
individual or corporation merely looking at the net 
revenue forgone by not clearing its forest.   
In some situations, such as when genuine 
politically driven development programs or land 
reform or national security purposes are involved, 
the government may have no interest in halting the 
process of orderly deforestation, regardless of what 
it tells the press and what the simple, first round 
opportunity costs happens to be.  Such deforesta-
tion, often occurring for strong political reasons, 
is in many cases outside the practical reach of an 
international REDD program.15  In cases where a 
government might be willing to redirect a land 
reform or settlement program, REDD costs might 
include, for example, ones related to finding alter-
native sources of income for settlers so they don’t 
have to clear as much forest to gain their livelihood. 
Compensation of losers in the reform process also 
may be needed, particularly if equity and fairness 
criteria are of concern.  The payments required 
might well go far beyond the production-foregone 
opportunity costs.
Karsenty’s (2007) critical assessment of the dif-
ferent types of “rent for development swaps” that 
may be relevant (as in the above case of conces-
sions) provides many other complicating factors in 
terms of developing a relevant cost figure for pro-
tecting forests.   Thus, tropical timber operations 
often involve taking out only a few commercially 
valuable trees per hectare, leaving the remainder of 
the forest to grow (and sequester and store carbon). 
While over time the entire forest being selectively 
logged may disappear as new species become com-
mercial or as the land is cleared after initial logging 
to be used for agriculture or other uses, the initial 
value of the carbon loss avoided by halting logging 
may not be that large, and certainly not equal to 
the carbon loss that would occur with clearcutting 
of the forest.  Also, if reduced impact logging (RIL) is 
used, one cost figure would apply.  If RIL is not used 
another cost figure would apply, even if the same 
commercial volume is removed.
Karsenty also points out that in one case, 
where an area of intact forest has not already been 
let out to a company on contract, payments would 
only have to be made to the government.  In other 
cases, a contract with a commercial entity may 
already have been made by the government, in 
which case payments would have to be made both 
to the entity to get them to give up the contract 
and to the government to cover the losses it would 
incur in terms of initial contract price and future 
revenues from timber taxes, fees, etc.
Corruption brings in several other complicat-
ing factors.  In the case of government contracts 
for use of public forest land, if there are ”side 
payments” to key decision makers, then it obvi-
ously becomes more complex in terms of the 
international community paying enough to halt the 
logging operations.  It comes back to the question 
of “opportunity cost to whom?”  This becomes a 
classic “carrot or stick” question.  We come down on 
the side of the “stick” or better enforcement of laws 
against corruption and illegal activity.  In many 
cases, achieving better enforcement will involve 
major initial incentive payments to governments in 
addition to technical support.
In addition, in the case of international REDD 
payments to governments, there is ample oppor-
tunity to not meet the additionality criterion, e.g., 
in the case of a misjudged baseline figure or when 
there is international “environmental blackmail.”  
(For example, the government says it would be de-
foresting X hectares of forest per year, but actually 
would have deforested much less.  Some suggest 
that this is the case with the recent Guyana agree-
ment to limit its deforestation in return for sizable 
payments. (Cf. Lang 2009, ).   According to FAO 
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statistics, Guyana has had negligible deforestation 
between 1990 and 2005.  A good indication in cases 
of suspected “environmental blackmail” might be 
the willingness of a relevant entity or government 
to take considerably less than a realistically calcu-
lated opportunity cost for deforestation.
INDIVIDUALS AND PARTNERSHIPS IN THE 
MARKET ECONOMY
If we are dealing with individuals or private 
partnerships that have clear title to their forest 
land, opportunity cost (OC) would be a relevant 
indicator as a starting point for the negotiations for 
REDD+ payments.  However, in calculating and us-
ing OC or any other measure of payments required, 
the additionality criterion needs to be kept in mind. 
A lot of “environmental blackmail” could occur, or 
an inappropriate deforestation baseline might be 
used, resulting in payments to people who actu-
ally never had any intention of cutting down or 
degrading the forest on their land.  McKinsey and 
Company (2009) acknowledged this additionality 
issue and its impact on the relationship between 
expected money transfers and opportunity costs:
A payment for ecosystems services’ ap-
proach (…) could have very high inefficien-
cies ; i.e. compensation is likely to go to 
some who would have not deforested in 
any case, increasing payment by a factor 
of between 2 times and 100 times” (p. 122)
Such a phenomenon has already been ob-
served in Costa-Rica with the national PES pro-
gram:  “Some suggest the program has achieved 
modest reductions, others that the effect has 
been negligible (Pagiola, 2006; Pfaff, Robalino, and 
Sánchez-Azofeifa, 2006). The studies all agree that 
many landowners who received payments would 
have conserved their forest even without them and 
that the decline in Costa Rica’s national deforesta-
tion rates cannot be attributed principally to the 
payments” (Kaimowitz, 2007, p. ). This situation 
seems unavoidable in PES schemes that deal mainly 
with potential losses avoided, as there is a trade-off 
between sound assessment of the additionality cri-
terion and transaction costs: ascertaining whether 
the landowners’ forests are really threatened (and 
providing a reasonable time frame for the likely 
concretization of this threat) is challenging, time-
consuming and will be costly.16 
Another category of individuals are those who 
participate in government land reform projects.  
They often come from the cities and towns and are 
in the market economy.  They are given a tract of 
forest land to partially clear and use for agriculture, 
generally using more modern techniques than 
the traditional shifting cultivators and slash and 
burn farmers.  In this case, it is government policy 
that needs to be changed, if indeed government 
wants to change its policies on frontier settlement 
and land reform.  Again, opportunity cost in the 
traditional sense is not the relevant indicator of 
the resource needs to accomplish improvements 
(from a deforestation point of view) in such land 
distribution policies and programs.  Rather, the 
underlying political pressures that are driving the 
policies and their implementation and political 
“opportunity costs” need to be addressed.   This can 
involve substantial institutional and infrastructure 
investment costs.  Although external financial and 
technical support may be required, the will and 
incentive to change such policies and programs 
must be internal for changes to be effective on a 
sustainable basis.  
CORPORATIONS
If we are dealing with corporations publicly 
owned by shareholders, then, while opportunity 
costs (plus transactions and implementation costs) 
may be a good indicator of the resources needed, 
they may become inappropriate or irrelevant in the 
larger scheme of things, because public corpora-
tions have a legal, fiduciary obligation to their 
shareholders to keep operating as profitably as pos-
sible.  Thus, unless corporate entities can be con-
vinced (with money or new technology) to change 
their approach to their business (i.e., deforesting 
9and then putting the land to different uses),  or con-
vinced by purchasers boycotts17 of the company’s  
outputs from lands they have deforested, it almost 
can be guaranteed that leakage will take place, 
although it may be in another country and possibly 
by another entity trying to supply market demand.  
Applying the “additionality” criterion to the case 
of leakage, the theoretical opportunity cost for the 
land in question would not be relevant. 
Even if one could convince the particular 
corporation involved to go into a different busi-
ness or do things differently, as prices increase due 
to decreasing supply and unchanged or growing 
demand, incentives to get in the business would 
increase and there would be other producers enter-
ing the market in other countries or regions taking 
up the slack, some of them by deforesting and then 
producing the output not being produced by those 
paid off by the REDD program.  As product prices 
go up so do the opportunity costs of not deforest-
ing.  Ultimately, we need to address the demand 
side, if we want to reign in deforestation for a given 
demanded global market traded output; either that 
or find ways to markedly improve productivity on 
existing, non forested land producing the output18.  
Actually, both should be addressed!  
In the case of legal timber extraction in the 
Amazon, stopping selective logging of valuable 
species can have a high opportunity cost.  In this 
case there are some intermediate options that exist 
if the opportunity cost to the logger is higher than 
what is considered a reasonable incentive payment 
not to log.  Boerner and Wunder (2008) suggest that 
in such cases: “one pathway is to offer payments 
for reduced-impact logging that minimizes carbon 
losses. A second would be a “log-and protect” strat-
egy of extracting only the most valuable timbers 
and then setting aside the resulting secondary 
forests for strict conservation.” (p.510).  Since nor-
mally after logging the land often is then further 
deforested for agricultural or ranching develop-
ment, the opportunity costs for those activities also 
would need to be accounted for if the logged over 
forest is to be protected from further deforestation. 
In such cases, Boerner and Wunder suggest that 
“…governments might decide to tax income from 
private REDD agreements to make up for losses in 
productive activity, which would further increase 
total costs.”  
Obviously, if leakage is expected, either in the 
same country or in a different country, then the 
REDD program should not pay the corporation; and 
calculating the opportunity cost becomes irrele-
vant.  The IWG-IFR report (2009) makes a significant 
and strategic statement about leakages in the con-
text of the necessary conditions for REDD to work:
“To be effective, the incentive structure 
must meet two criteria: (i) it must have 
close to global coverage – an incentive 
that is attractive for one country but 
not others is likely to lead to interna-
tional leakage (simply displacing emit-
ting activities to another country)  
and hence represent an ineffective use 
of scarce finances; (ii) the frameworks to 
address deforestation and degradation in 
developing forest countries must be na-
tionally coherent – finance that is made 
available primarily on a project basis may 
cause domestic leakage and similarly lead 
to ineffective use of public and private 
capital.”(p.10, emphasis added)
These are sound criteria. Unfortunately, how 
to deal with them is not discussed further. They 
need to be addressed in much greater depth.  Leak-
age could become a major concern, if not dealt with 
in international REDD+ debates.19 
With regard to leakages, it is not only large 
projects having a noticeable effect on the market 
that one needs to worry about.  Murray et al (2004) 
point out that:
It is commonly argued that small projects 
will have neglible effects on the affected 
markets and therefore generate little 
leakage.  Our results suggest otherwise.  
For small projects, leakage may be small 
in absolute terms, but it tends to be 
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larger in proportion to the direct project 
benefit than a larger program…Thus, leak-
age outside the boundaries of even small 
projects should not be ignored. (Bold 
added).(p.24)
While their conclusions are based primarily on 
analysis of the U.S. market situation, one needs to 
be aware of this potential:  Even small projects can 
have enough leakage to negate the justification for 
payments equal to opportunity cost if one takes the 
additionality criterion seriously.20
In considering opportunity costs associated 
with corporations,one also has to consider the 
existence of perverse incentives and “opportun-
ist opportunity costs” created by the baseline 
scenario itself.  An illustration of the limited rel-
evance in certain contexts of the “compensation 
or the opportunity costs” principle can be found 
in the recent DRC’s REDD + strategy (MECNT, 2009) 
drafted by a McKinsey consulting team. The report 
estimates that between 1.6 to 3 million hectares 
of forested lands in the DRC could be converted in 
the near future to industrial oil palm production 
(but no mention is made of any contract already 
signed). The report thus indicates a “potential 
mitigation lever” of 80 millions TCO2 (i.e.,19 % 
of the total potential) in the implementation of 
the plantation in savannah areas instead of in 
forested areas (“new [oil palm] plantations that 
would have been established on primary forests 
leading to 1.6 to 3 millions hectares deforested in 
the baseline scenario”)[translation from French by 
the authors, emphasis added]. In such a case, the 
opportunity cost of this “mitigation option” is the 
difference between the net economic margin from 
the oil palm plantations if they were established 
on the primary forest (baseline) and the lower 
margin resulting from the “diversion” of future 
plantations on savannah areas, less suitable for 
such plantations. 
In the same vein, compensation to logging 
companies is identified as another “mitigation 
potential lever” by the DRC report (MECNT, 2009).  
Although the current rate of legal harvest of com-
mercial timber is between 3 to 5 m3 on average per 
hectare in the DRC (vs.60-80 m3 in dense forests in 
Indonesia), due to high operating costs (transport, 
“administrative” costs, etc.), the report foresees an 
increase to 15 m3 per ha around 2030 (baseline), a 
quite unlikely figure inasmuch as the current ex-
traction rate in Cameroon (a country having struc-
turally lower transport costs) is between 8-10 m3. 
The report states (without explaining why) that 15 
m3 per ha would be “unsustainable”, and proposes 
a compensation for “reducing” (in the model…) the 
harvest rate from 15 to 10 m3 (a level considered 
as sustainable) and to compensate the foregone 
corresponding revenues. Besides the fact that, here 
again, one can consider that the baseline for 2030 
adopted is extremely unlikely, it is amazing to see 
that (i) the report suggests to “compensate” compa-
nies that are currently profitable with 3-5 m3 per ha 
and which probably will be better off at 10 m3; and 
(ii) if 15 m3 would be “unsustainable” (which still 
has to be demonstrated), it sounds more appropri-
ate to recommend that the government should set 
up a regulation capping the volume harvested per 
hectare. It would be a wiser and more responsible 
use of REDD funding21 and certainly less costly than 
using such financial incentives.
This is a case where the “mitigation option” 
(and the associated opportunity cost) has been 
artificially designed.  As in the case of Guyana, 
the DRC baseline scenario22 is performative in the 
sense it assumes the action is (virtually) done, 
once stated (in the national report), alleviating all 
hurdles and implementation barriers. (Large-scale 
agro-investments have often failed in central Africa, 
as opposed  to in Asia and South-America), and 
creating such a virtual mitigation potential could 
be construed by some to be close to setting up “en-
vironmental blackmail.” In addition, this illustrates 
how the perspective of being compensated for the 
“opportunity costs” (in a specific REDD architecture 
framework) creates perverse incentives: govern-
ments have interest to plan as much forest conver-
sion as possible (in the name of the “economic 
rationality”) and the potential oil palm investors 
have the incentive to target huge tracts of dense 
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forests with the hope of receiving major financial 
compensation for not clearing the land.
Summing up the above discussion of use of 
opportunity cost for the four main groups of agents 
responsible for deforestation in situations where 
it is legal, it is evident that opportunity cost has 
served its purpose to get a lot of key decision mak-
ers interested in REDD+ possibilities because of 
the low resulting cost estimates.   However, it also 
is evident that these estimates probably will be 
of limited use as we move on to assess options for 
REDD+ in the context of national political realities, 
focused at the country, driver and agent of defor-
estation levels, and considering the reality of the 
socio-economic contexts and the quality of overall 
and forest governance in many of the tropical 
forested countries.  
This third situation, in between the two 
extremes of legal right to deforest and legal pro-
hibition against deforesting, involves a large area 
of forest in tropical countries and primarily the 
poorer and most disenfranchised segments of a 
society – indigenous peoples, forest communities, 
migrant or “slash and burn” farmers and so forth.  
Most of these groups also live largely outside the 
market economy and live under traditional group 
rules for land use rather than formal property laws.  
As mentioned above, there is a welcome trend 
towards converting traditional rights or de facto 
rights taken through “spontaneous” settlement 
into legal land use or property rights.  (cf. Caldes, 
et al 2010 and Simmons et al 2010) As mentioned, 
while some 35 percent of the Brazilian Amazon 
public domain lands have been allocated legally 
to Indigenous Peoples and protected areas, there 
still is 40 percent of the public domain land where 
many poor and disenfranchised people live without 
tenure security and ownership and thus would not 
be in a position to participate in a carbon offset 
REDD market that requires compliance level carbon 
offsets (and thus legal rights to the forest land 
involved) in order to enter the market.  
In fact, if REDD funding takes place through 
a market-based mechanism at a national scale, 
where governments would receive carbon credits 
in exchange for reducing deforestation, it could end 
up seriously hurting people living on and using for-
est lands that are poorly defined in terms of legal 
use rights.  These people at present are for the most 
part merely tolerated by governments because 
there is no other economically pressing demands 
on the land and moving them off the land would 
create pressing social and security problems and 
could involve major costs.  With the incoming REDD 
funds, governments now could see some economic 
value in instituting coercive measures to have 
these groups stop any deforestation they are caus-
ing.  Governments might establish preserves and 
not compensate adequately (the opportunity costs 
of) the groups that were using the land beforehand, 
thus creating a serious socioeconomic problem and 
a likely problem in terms of halting illegal use of the 
new preserves.  
If governments pay these people anything to 
help protect public domain lands, it is unlikely to 
have much to do with their opportunity costs; and 
to be effective, payments most likely will need to in-
clude government investments in alternative sources 
of livelihoods and in community development23.  
If we should attempt to calculate opportunity 
costs and use them in designing compensation 
2.3      WHEN LEGAL PROPERTY AND USE RIGHTS HAVE NOT BEEN  
 DEFINED CLEARLY AND ASSIGNED DEFINITIVELY TO GROUPS  
 OR INDIVIDUALS OCCUPYING LAND
Do Opportunity Costs Indicate the Real Compensation Needed for Successful REDD+?12
and incentive payment schemes for these types of 
groups, we have to remember that it is perceived 
opportunity cost on the part of the potential recipi-
ent of a payment that matters in terms of them 
making a voluntary choice to deforest or not to 
deforest.  In this case, it relates to, but definitely is 
not defined by the market value of what the occupi-
ers of the forest land would have produced on the 
land in the way of food, materials to build shelters, 
firewood to cook their meals, and perhaps a few 
products to sell in local markets.  How would we 
value these mainly non-market outputs per ton of 
carbon not released, particularly considering that 
the land might or might not be totally deforested, 
be abandoned in a few years, and possibly go back 
to forest?  We would have to pay careful attention 
to the estimation of carbon losses over time from 
shifting cultivation or slash and burn agriculture.  
Many indigenous people farm or use the forest in 
agroforestry systems with very little disturbance of 
the large trees; and this is where most of the above 
ground carbon in a natural forest is stored.
More importantly, even if we could value their 
meager outputs foregone, giving the forest dwell-
ers or farmers money equivalent to the market val-
ues of those outputs forgone wouldn’t help them 
much: Assuming that they won’t go elsewhere and 
practice their traditional slash and burn agriculture 
(i.e., we need to consider the likelihood of leakage 
and do something about it), where do they go to 
live? Where do they get housing, food, fuelwood, 
furniture, etc., and how much will those things cost, 
if they can find a place to purchase them?  What are 
their alternative sources of livelihood?  Will there 
be problems if they move to cities or towns where 
they can find the housing, food, wood fuel etc., that 
they normally get from the forest?  What do they do 
with their lives?  Their perception of their oppor-
tunity cost should include consideration of these 
questions plus the uncertainty associated with an 
unknown change in their lives.  Even though they 
live with risks day to day, this new and different 
kind of uncertainty may be accompanied by fear 
of the unknown, which could raise their perceived 
“opportunity cost” or more correctly their required 
payment significantly to voluntarily give up their 
way of life.  Of course, governments can always 
force them to quit their migrant agricultural 
practices since in most cases they have no legal 
rights to the land they occupy.  However, then a 
major social problem would be created and leakage 
would be much more likely.  The costs of resolving 
such problems could be large.
In addition to the above problems with using 
opportunity cost as an indicator of compensation 
required for these kinds of land users, the transac-
tions costs could be very significant:  Setting up 
payment schemes for such groups could become 
a logistical nightmare with very high transactions 
and implementation costs, especially in “weak 
states” where institutions are ineffective and infra-
structure is poor or nonexistent in forested areas. 
Let’s imagine the cost of reaching remote areas in 
the DRC, negotiating and contracting with com-
munities who will be prompt to compete for forest 
tenure since there is a new financial opportunity 
(conservation PES) at stake; and imagine trying to 
do an adequate job of monitoring, reporting and 
verification (MRV) in such a context.  In many cases 
the local people are not organized, so there is no 
one central entity with whom to bargain for an ap-
propriate REDD+ payment.
The bottom line is that, while these groups 
may have traditional rights to the land, if those 
have not been translated into modern legal rights, 
they would not be able to make legal agreements 
about the land and the forest on it.  So they are at 
the mercy of the government and project support-
ers in terms of sharing in REDD+ funding.  Fortu-
nately, as mentioned, more and more countries are 
transferring legal rights to forest communities and 
indigenous peoples on demarcated lands, such as in 
the case of Brazil.  However, in other countries, such 
as in West & Central Africa, not having undertaken 
the same process as Brazil, the perspective of “pay-
ments for avoided deforestation” schemes is likely 
to turn numerous current low-intensity disputes 
over land control into open and sometimes violent 
conflicts for the land (and the expected “carbon 
rents”). 
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Preventing such conflicts, fixing them and 
initiating consensual mapping processes followed 
by land rights registration, appears a prerequisite 
for implementing large-scale PES payments in 
REDD schemes for the many millions of poor people 
who currently live on forest lands with poorly or 
non-defined legal use rights. Costs could be high 
and politically unpopular.  However,  they are a 
necessary part of implementing a successful REDD+ 
program involving the millions of people who live 
in legal limbo on public domain lands.
If fairness in treatment of such people enters 
into consideration, Then the “transition” or “trans-
action” costs involved would likely be substantial. 
Yet, even though these costs are mentioned by all, 
they do not seem to be adequately considered by 
many of the major studies looking at opportunity 
costs.  For example, such costs are acknowledged 
but left out of the “mitigation costs” provided by 
McKinsey and Company (2009) . Others explicitly 
recognize such costs.  Grieg-Gran (2008) points 
out that in the case of Costa Rica, if one assumes 
“… that 50% of PES recipients have to contract 
intermediaries to help them with their applications, 
including these costs in the calculation would 
almost double the administration costs bringing 
them to US$6 per ha at least for the first five years 
of a payment contract.” (p.9)  
Since that estimate is for Costa Rica, which 
is institutionally and in terms of literacy one of 
the more advanced countries, this has to be taken 
as a lower bound figure.  In the poorer countries 
there generally is an inverse relationship between 
the magnitude of the opportunity costs and the 
transaction and implementation costs: The lower 
the opportunity costs, the higher the transactions 
and long term implementation costs.  Viana et al 
(2009, p.1) point out that ” Juma (Forest Reserve 
REDD project) shows that significant expenditure is 
likely to be needed over and above the rewards to 
local communities and up to 40 per cent of the total 
costs to ensure that permanent emission reduc-
tions are generated.”
Karsenty (2007) points out that going after the 
often perceived lowest cost REDD options, such 
as the slash and burn farmers, forest communities 
and indigenous peoples, risks perpetuating their 
poverty.  In that sense, this mechanism risks impos-
ing the role of biodiversity (and carbon) reservoirs 
on the poorest forested countries. This is certainly 
in exchange for some rent, but only a ‘poor man’s 
rent’ since the latter is calculated according to the 
‘lowest cost’ based on compensations in under-
developed countries and regions. 
Actually, such an issue also is acknowledged 
by McKinsey and Company (2009 p.122): “Practical, 
political and ethical reasons are likely to discon-
nect compensation to potential deforesters from 
the opportunity cost. For example, transfers to for-
est people or the landless poor might need to ex-
ceed opportunity costs substantially…)”. However, 
this lucid statement did not lead to a revision of 
their “mitigation cost curve”, nor soften their claim 
that “avoided deforestaton from slash-and-burn 
agriculture, and avoided deforestation from cattle 
ranching, offer high potential abatement at a very 
low average cost of below € 2/ tCO2e” (pp.120-121). 
In the case  where fairness, and traditional 
rights and cultural values of indigenous peoples 
and forest communities are respected and consid-
ered, the degradation of the forest can be reduced 
through use of REDD+ funds not only to pay these 
groups not to deforest, but also to: (i) increase 
productivity of the already cleared lands in such 
a way as to permit the farmers to stay longer on a 
given tract of land,  (ii)  find and create alternative 
sources of livelihoods, including outside the forest, 
and (iii) encourage development of more perma-
nent settlements by clarifying legal rights to the 
land and titling land to the IPs, communities or set-
tlers involved.   Most of these options would involve 
public “investment costs” quite different from 
the opportunity and transactions costs normally 
calculated for this category of potential agents of 
deforestation.  The institutional costs of resettling 
people, finding alternative sources of livelihoods 
for them, etc., have to be considered.  
It would appear that opportunity costs are just 
the tip of the iceberg when it comes to estimating 
the real compensation that will have to flow into 
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tropical developing countries to implement effec-
tive, efficient and fair REDD+ programs.  The insti-
tutional investment costs involved in governance 
reforms can be significant and such reforms cannot 
be done overnight.  Yet in many countries they are 
essential before REDD+ can be a success.
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THE WAY AHEAD: HELPING GOVERNMENTS GET THE REDD+ 
RESPONSE FRAMEWORK RIGHT.3
We are here that the emphasis at this point 
should be shifting – as it is in many organiza-
tions, from analyzing global costs and options to 
looking at design and implementation issues at 
the national level:  (a) determining what actions 
are needed from governments on the policy and 
legal fronts to improve forest governance;24 (b) 
developing alternative cross sectoral strategies 
and approaches (getting rid of perverse policies) to 
make REDD+ work,  and (c) analyzing and assessing 
in depth the likely longer term institutional invest-
ment costs that will need to be incurred and where 
they will come from.25  The above is not a novel 
suggestion.  In fact, the latest major work on REDD+ 
coming out of CIFOR (Angelsen et al 2009) concen-
trates on “national strategy and policy options.” 
Such nationally focused themes as “Building REDD+ 
institutional architecture and processes” and 
“Enabling REDD+ through broad policy reforms” are 
covered in detail.
The Governance of Forests Initiative (2009, p.2) 
points out that there is both a need and an opportu-
nity for good forest governance in REDD:  “a REDD 
mechanism that does not address poor governance 
as a fundamental driver of deforestation poses a 
risk of reversing past progress on these issues. At 
the same time, the political momentum behind 
the REDD debate has the potential to create new 
incentives and stronger support for tackling some 
of the most entrenched governance problems.”  
Current writings on REDD and REDD+ almost all 
stress to a greater or lesser extent the need to focus 
on governance issues.   Yet most of the available lit-
erature does not get into the subject of governance 
improvement in depth, and particularly not at the 
country level.  Much more thinking and action in 
this area are needed.26
This focus on improved forest governance 
also is supported by a recent survey of ongoing 
REDD demonstration and readiness activities 
(Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Kongphan-apirak, 2009).   
After assigning “governance scores” to countries 
involved in these activities, the authors conclude 
that:  “None of the countries with REDD+ activities 
(except one in Latin America) have a high gover-
nance level score. Countries with low governance 
scores have a large share of REDD+ activities.” 
(p.8)  Most of the investment in REDD+ so far has 
had little concern for the per unit opportunity 
costs involved.  Rather it is government ODA funds 
determined on political grounds and is related to 
processes that will lead to “REDD+ readiness” in 
countries.  
Wertz--Kanounnikoff and Kongphan-apirak 
conclude that “This leaning towards low gover-
nance environments offers opportunities to reduce 
current barriers to carbon finance for REDD+ by 
investing in measures to enhance governance (e.g. 
tenure reform, command-and-control).  At the same 
time, governance investments or other non-PES 
policies can directly result in reduced emissions 
and, hence, function as direct instruments for 
REDD+.” (p.9)
The authors go on to make the important 
suggestion that,  “especially in low governance 
contexts, policy makers, donors and other REDD+ 
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investors could pay explicit attention to the poten-
tial of governance or other policy investments (e.g. 
enhanced enforcement of tenure rules and respon-
sibilities) as a more cost-effective option than PES-
type deals to directly reduce forest emissions.”  (p.9) 
The prerequisites for good governance are 
discussed elsewhere.27 While good governance 
explicitly has to involve civil society and the private 
sector, the dominance of government in setting the 
course for governance reform in the context of the 
mix of institutions involved in most tropical coun-
tries is clear under present circumstances. Thus, 
the rest of this discussion focuses on the needed 
public sector tools and investments to support 
governance reform and guide REDD+ related activi-
ties undertaken by various entities in the private as 
well as public sectors.  
There basically are three sets of policy instru-
ments that governments have available to influ-
ence those who own or control forests.  These be-
come the implementing tools of good governance.  
One is laws and regulations that define rights and 
ownership and put limits on what one can and 
cannot do with forests, e.g., the establishment of 
forest preserves and various zoning tools; and it 
includes organization reform laws that deal with 
transparency, inclusiveness, and communication 
improvements.  A second tool is fiscal mechanisms, 
e.g., taxes and payments that create incentives 
not to deforest and provide the source of funding 
for action.  And the third is public management 
and investment, including investment in activities 
that help create markets for forest environmental 
services (PES type activities) and help strengthen 
local law enforcement, reduce corruption and other 
essential elements in good governance.  The three 
sets of instruments are of course closely linked.  A 
good REDD+ governance framework or architecture 
will draw on all three of these sets of instruments. 
Some of the main options that need to be 
considered within each category include: 
Laws and regulations:
 clarifying and legalizing existing traditional 
and undefined tenure and land use rights, both on 
paper and on the ground if a good cadastral system 
is not already in place; redefining land use laws 
and policies, including zoning regulations, to cre-
ate increased incentives not to deforest; establish 
more restricted use protected areas, preserves and 
conservation areas;28
 improving the enforcement of forest laws and 
expanding the control of illegal forest activity and 
corruption;
 passing governance reform legislation that 
deals with transparency, inclusiveness and ac-
countability;
 Rationalizing forest industry contracts for har-
vest on public lands and encouraging low impact 
logging where feasible;
 Getting rid of perverse laws and policies in 
other sectors that encourage deforestation; and 
developing laws that deal directly with intersec-
toral policies needed to control the relationships  
between the forest sector and those sectors that 
are linked to deforestation (e.g., agriculture, energy 
and mining, transportation, etc.).
Fiscal mechanisms – taxes and payments:
 stopping the  subsidization of forest clearing 
and forest degradation via agricultural subsidies 
and tax incentives, public road building that opens 
up lands, etc.,, encourage restructuring of some 
industries and encourage the agriculture sector to 
improve productivity on existing agricultural lands 
in ways that take pressures off forest clearing; 
 expanding micro credit programs and other in-
centives for villagers and communities to establish 
businesses that provide alternatives to forest de-
struction; encouraging , e.g., through tax incentives, 
certification of forest operations and the benefits 
that go along with certification;
 using fiscal mechanisms to encourage indus-
tries to source their inputs from companies that do 
not use unsustainable practices involving defores-
tation in producing those inputs;
Public management and investment
 investing in the institutional infrastructure 
needed to clarify and make property rights secure, 
and managing the process openly and fairly as the 
process is implemented. 
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 Investing in the design and distribution of fuel 
efficient stoves and charcoal production systems, 
given that a lot of forest degradation is due to 
wood fuel and charcoal demand;29
 investing in education, extension, research 
and technology development that favors intensifi-
cation of agricultural production on existing lands 
rather than newly deforested land, and that encour-
ages longer productive use of given areas of land 
already deforested, e.g., in the case slash and burn 
or shifting cultivation agriculture. 30
 investing in plans, programs and procedures, 
including financing mechanisms beyond REDD+, to 
encourage and support forest rehabilitation and 
restoration (R&R), and reforestation and afforesta-
tion where appropriate as part of an overall attack 
on poor land use that contributes to poverty, car-
bon release or reduced sequestration capacity, and 
loss of biodiversity; 
 investing to make sure that the co-benefits 
from REDD are fully realized.  It is very conceivable 
that in given areas carbon benefits alone may not 
justify payments that would lead to less forest 
degradation and deforestation.  However, when wa-
tershed, biodiversity and other benefits are added 
in, the total benefits may justify from an economic 
perspective adequate payment to change behavior;
 investing in development of effective and 
realistic approaches and procedures to ensure fair 
and transparent sharing of benefits from REDD; 
which means investing in clarifying and assigning 
property rights, development of participatory gov-
ernance processes, involving local forest communi-
ties in decision making, etc;31
 Investing in climated adaptation measures 
that can lead to avoiding a speeding up of carbon 
losses from forests, e.g., reducing fire danger, 
expanded insect or disease early warning systems 
and controls, etc.
The public investment costs implied by the 
above suggestions mainly relate to improving gov-
ernance and REDD+ “readiness,”- in moving toward 
a participatory governance capacity and processes 
that can handle major REDD+ investments both 
through ODA funding and through carbon offset 
markets and special programs designed specifically 
to support REDD activities.  Each country needs to 
tailor its use of these instruments to its particular 
socioeconomic and political contexts.  Above all 
each country needs to take ownership of its REDD+ 
readiness activities.  Investment costs involved in 
such improvements can be quite high and quite 
variable country by country. 32 However, such costs 
need to be incurred, since as mentioned most 
assessments of preconditions for effective REDD 
programs confirm that having good, participatory 
and fair governance is a prerequisite. 33  
It is important to reiterate, as indicated above, 
that investments in governance and other non-PES 
policies can act as direct instruments for achiev-
ing REDD+.  Governance improvements are a key 
element in the overall proposed framework for 
interim financing put forth by the IWG-IFR (2009).  
However, not nearly enough thinking and debate 
have been devoted to the subject and the size and 
nature of the investment that will be required to 
make needed improvements in different country 
situations.  We need to focus more in depth on the 
institutional issues that are at the very heart of 
whether or not REDD+ will work in practice.  And 
that will have to take place country by country.  
REDD+ is a “grand experiment” that will involve an 
iterative process of successive approximations as 
the associated institutional investment costs and 
governance issues become better defined and un-
derstood.  Unfortunately, this is not a “one answer 
fits all” situation.  Although countries can learn 
from each other and from accumulated experience, 
the “experiment” still will have to have a distinct 
nationally focused and owned result.
The real costs that emerge surely are going 
to be quite different from those estimated so far.34 
Some actual costs may seem to be lower than 
current estimates, especially when the so-called 
mitigation potentials are associated with baseline 
scenarios sounding more like environmental black-
mail than objective and credible forecasts of likely 
deforestation.  
Some costs likely will be much higher than 
calculated opportunity costs, especially when in-
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vestments for creating local economic alternatives 
that are able to pull poor forest and forest margin 
dwellers out of poverty are considered.  Since fair-
ness and poverty alleviation also are at stake, it 
appears that the debate on which cost estimates to 
use is not only a technical economic one, but also 
about how a world really committed to reducing 
deforestation and poverty (the first MDG) should 
evolve and proceed in the design of a global REDD+ 
program - favoring the “lowest cost” efficient 
carbon sequestration option or the one that also 
considers poverty reduction.  
One bright light in the REDD efficiency- pov-
erty trade-off is that in many cases it may turn out 
to be a “win-win” one: “Although the unit costs of 
carbon abatement via REDD would most likely in-
crease with efforts to integrate equity and poverty 
concerns, these increased costs need to be met in 
order to ensure the delivery of (REDD) project or 
programme outputs – indeed this expenditure is 
likely to be highly cost-effective.” (Olsen and Bishop 
2009, p. iv).  We agree with that assessment.  The 
above suggestions hopefully contribute to moving 
along the path to understanding and making the 
“win-win” scenarios materialize.
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ENDNOTES
*	 The authors wish to thank, A. Angelsen, J.E.M. Arnold, N. Byron, A. Contreras-Hermosilla, and D. Kaimowitz for useful comments 
on earlier drafts of the paper.  The arguments and errors, of course, remain those of the authors.
1 Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation.  The “+” is added on to include such things as forest  restora-
tion, reforestation and other forest related activities (including the vague concept of “forest conservation”) that can increase 
carbon sequestration and storage rather than just halting emissions. The scope of the “+” is under review, since there are 
substantial disagreements on what should be included.
2 such as Stern (2008), Eliasch (2009), and most recently, the “Interim Financing for REDD” report by the “Informal Working 
Group”on interim financing (IWG-IFR, 2009) . They use opportunity cost   as a main indicator of the amount that would have to 
be paid to those who deforest to get them to halt deforestation or degradation.  Most studies add on some modest transac-
tions and implementation costs to arrive at estimates of the total institutional costs of implementing REDD+.
3  It recently was brought to our attention that a recently published paper by Ghazoul et al, 2010 raises a number of similar ques-
tions about opportunity cost in relation to compensation needed to achieve REDD+.
4 For a more technical discussion of the use of opportunity cost, see. Grieg-Gran 2008,  Pagiola and Bosquet, 2009, Murray, 
Lubowski and Sohngen, 2009, and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, S.  2008.
5 If people are paid not to deforest when they had no intention of doing so, then the payments have no net impact in terms of 
REDD according to the additionality criterion; and if someone gets paid not to deforest 1,000 hectares in location X and then 
goes and deforests 1,000 hectares elsewhere to make up for it, then payments also have no net impact in terms of the leakage 
criterion.
6 See discussion of these criteria in Angelsen (ed). 2008, and Angelsen et al (ed). 2009.
7 We are by no means the first to find problems with the use of opportunity costs in a REDD context.  Even the IWG-IFR 
(2009,p.23) recognizes that “Opportunity cost – the income foregone by the alternative high-carbon activity – represents a good 
indication of the funding to be required to alter land use decisions, but it has many shortcomings.” And Pirard (2008b, p.8) con-
cludes that:  “although numerous studies are available to calculate the opportunity costs of avoided deforestation, in reality 
their utility seems very limited to forecasting what would be the financial requirement to act against deforestation.” 
8 In many cases, a main problem will be the time it takes to get acceptable systems of monitoring, reporting and verification 
(MRV) set up and to get adequate assurances of additionality.  Cf. Hansen et al (2009).
9 Sometimes, the laws are inadequate or unenforceable and removing them can be more appropriate.  In such a case, the use of 
economic instruments might be relevant, once the legislation has been changed.
10 We take note, however,  of Boerner and Wunder’s (2008) suggestion that:  “Experiments with inverse auction systems where 
producers ‘self-reveal’ their costs and preferences have progressed sufficiently to also pilot these techniques in the Amazon, 
thus validating ex-ante cost estimates and avoiding over- or underpaying individual farmers due to aggregation errors.”  While 
we sympathize with the idea, we believe that practical application of such systems on a meaningful scale will only take place 
far in the future.
11 Boerner and Wunder, 2008, citing Toni 2006.  Terra Devoluta is defined in Brazilian law (Article 3, law 601 of 1850), as ““untitled, 
unoccupied government land not earmarked for public use.”
12 Direct action land reform is a social and political process involving mobilization of the poor, the contentious occupation of 
public or private lands, and the formalization of land holdings in the wake of occupation (Simmons et al. 2010, as cited in 
Caldas et al, 2009).
13 See Chabal and Daloz (1999) for an illustration in Africa
14 E.g., in the cases where removal of a certain percentage of forest is required for people involved in land settlement programs 
to be able to take final title to the property.
15 Imagine asking the U.S. government to stop deforestation in the early nation building days when settling the country and 
developing its economy, was fueled in many areas by the capital derived from massive deforestation.  The amounts of money 
23
that would have been needed to stop that westward movement (and consequent deforestation) would have been astronomi-
cal, both in terms of opportunity costs (incentive payments) and in terms of enforcement costs.  It probably would not have 
been of interest to the U.S. government for strategic reasons.  
16 While “predictive” models can more or less anticipate where the next deforestation will take place (usually close to roads), 
they are incapable of telling when they will occur: this depends particularly on agricultural prices – and, incidentally, on the 
price of wood – which vary according to global market speculation.
17 It is interesting to note that Unilever, the largest user of palm oil recently suspended a $31 million contract with a major Indo-
nesian producer group until the group can prove that it is not contributing to deforestation.  Producers are concerned that 
other North American and European buyers might join in the boycott.  (Asia Sentinel, 2010).
18 As pointed out by Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 2001, some technologies reduce pressures to clear new forest, but others actually 
encourage expansion onto new forest land.  Thus improvement in technology is not enough.  It needs to be coupled with poli-
cies, laws and fiscal mechanisms that steer companies away from deforesting.
19	 Murray (2008, p.27) suggests that “…the evidence suggests that leakage potential could be large and should be taken seriously 
by those charged with developing policy options.”
20 More detailed discussion on leakage is provided by Wunder (2008), Murray (2008).
21 Without even speaking of the equity dimension vis-à-vis the poorest populations who will never understand how the govern-
ment could “compensate” logging companies for not doing what they could have been doing in an hypothetical scenario…
22 Called “economically rational scenario” in Guyana by McKinsey and company which, like in the case of the DRC, prepared 
Guyana’s REDD strategy.
23 Cf. Viana et al, 2009.
24 Forest governance is defined  here as (Contreras et al 2008): “the set of rules and institutions that control and determine what 
happens to a nation’s forests and who gains and who gets hurt as a consequence.”  
25 We note here that the Chatham House and ProForest prepared for the Eliasch Review estimates of “…the cost of building ca-
pacity in rainforest nations to allow them to participate in a global REDD mechanism.” (See Hoare et al, 2008).  This assessment 
provides some order of magnitude estimates of initial institutional costs for the 40 rainforest countries thought at that time 
most likely to be included in early REDD activities.
26 Groups such as the OECD and the World Bank also have major programs dealing with governance, (cf., www.oecd.org/dac/gov-
ernance ;  World Bank, 2009
27 The Institute on Governance (Graham et al 2003a) puts forth the following five generally accepted principles of good gover-
nance in general: legitimacy and voice, direction (strategic vision), Performance (responsiveness, effectiveness, efficiency); 
accountability and transparency, and fairness (equity and rule of law).  See also Contreras et al, 2008;  Governance of Forests 
Initiative, 2009;  World Bank, 2009;
28 A lot of evidence exists that indigenous peoples reserves and protected areas with active involvement of forest dwellers, 
contribute to protecting forests and avoiding deforestation.  The literature was recently summed up by Ricketts et al 2010.
29 Given various debacles in the improved wood stove field since it became fashionable about 1980, such added investment 
would have to be carefully planned. There also is the “rebound effect” - people cook more and more often once they get more 
efficient stoves, and so total consumption often in fact increases. 
30 One reviewer reminded us  that if research leads to increases in productivity that in turn leads to increases in profitability 
(otherwise new improved technologies are unlikely to be adopted by companies and farmers),  then the pressure to deforest 
may increase, not decrease, particularly if land is scarce.  In Brazil where land is not terribly scarce, increased agricultural pro-
duction through mechanization left many agricultural workers out of work. They invaded forests to survive as there were no 
realistic alternatives for them.   Increased agricultural productivity can work both ways: less land is needed to produce a given 
level of output, but also, it will increase profitability and the propensity to expand those profitable activities to other lands. 
These other lands may be under forests.  So, it depends.  Research needs to be targeted and complementary policies need to be 
put in place.
31 In this regard, Coad et al, 2008, sums up the literature on this subject:  “Involving local communities in the planning and imple-
mentation of REDD, and ensuring that financial or other benefits are shared, is likely to result in a more sustainable solution to 
deforestation than are less participative strategies.” See also Hatcher, 2009  
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